Archive for the ‘Allgemeines’ Category

Beginnings and (hopefully) Becomings…

Wednesday, February 17th, 2010

In brief, what I want to discuss for the upcoming thesis:

The Greek word “Agon” denotes both a place of assembly (a space of contest – often in the theatre) and conflict, it is a mode of the appearance of struggle, which implicates its very notion in an aesthetic order. Typically, what is understood as constituting the sphere of “politics” are the sets of institutions, organizations of power and the “distribution of places and roles, and the systems of distribution” – which Rancière proposes to rename, in a non-pejorative fashion, ‘the police’. What he postulates as ‘politics’, rather, is the activity “antagonistic to policing: [as] whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration.” Modes of contestation proper to politics, as such, cannot occur within a preconfigured, preordained space, for such a notion presupposes ‘recognized’ actors and roles that are already acknowledged as ‘parties’ (those possessing the capacity of ‘understandable’ speech). The Agon, as such, if it is to be understood as within the realm of politics, is an appearance of an aesthetic sphere that is forever becoming, continually re-drawing lines of demarcation, roles, names, operations and modes of speech / communicative acts.

The making visible of Agon, hinges on the realm of the invisible, uncounted, un-placed and non-situated. But, following up on Agamben’s analysis of ‘exceptionality’, one cannot simply polarize the counted and the uncounted, the ‘police’ and politics, for the two domains pass through one another (Agamben calls this ‘di-polarities’). Rather what is necessary is to examine the ‘modes of indistinction’ that accommodate such a ‘passing through’. Such a conceptual configuration of ‘politics’ and ‘exclusion’ reposition the ethics of the author who seeks to engage in the ‘political’ realm; whose task is not merely to make visible the invisible, but rather to allude to the more complicated, nameless terrain, that constitutes the indifference between inside and outside.

Nietzsche’s “virtù” ethics will spur on the discussion surrounding the ethics of the authorial, in close attention to Bonnie Honig’s account of a “virtue / virtù” political ethics that perpetuate modes of contest and unsettlement. Arendt’s reading of Kant, in particular her notes on the Kantian spectator will also factor in since any discussion of an aesthetic appearance must include reference to the one who has the capacity to experience.


Friday, June 27th, 2008

From Paralogic Rhetoric: A Theory of Communicative Interaction by Thomas Kent

“…paralogy seeks to subsume logic. As the etymological origin of the term suggests, paralogy means beyond logic in that it accounts for the attribute of language-in-use that defies reduction to a codifiable process or to a system of logical relations.” p. 3

“Another way to understand Lyotard’s formulation of paralogy…is to view paralogy as a version of anti-logic. Closely related to Derridean deconstruction, antilogic is an interrogative technique that operates by drawing attention to a suppressed opposition in an argument.As G.B. Kerferd describes the technique, antilogic works by proceeding from a given logos, say the position adopted by an opponent, to the establishment of a contrary or contradictory logos in such a way that the opponent must either accept both logoi, or at least abandon his first position. Because antilogic works through negation – it offers no positive alternative to an assertion but simply employs the elements already present in someone else’s argument – antilogic, like deconstruction, posits no claim or argument that someone can refute.”

“In a sense, antilogic actually gives life to logic, for antilogic reveals the aporias and the suppressed oppositions that structure and animate every logical argument.”

“…paralogy lives beyond logic; paralogy describes the unpredictable moves we make when we employ a logical construct – a system of marks and noises, for example – in order to generate utterances. [...] paralogy cannot be reduced to an epistemological framework that may be employed to predict the efficacy of utterances. The most we can avow in a reductive way about paralogy is that paralogy is corresponds to guesswork. When we communicate we make guesses about the meaning of others’ utterances, and we, in turn, guess about the interpretations that others will give our utterances. This guesswork is paralogical in nature because no logical framework, process, or system can predict in advance the efficacy of our guesses.” p.5

Random Terms/Thoughts for Expansion

Tuesday, June 24th, 2008

Interruption as Transformation
Organization of the Subject
Non-Human Laughter
Sociality of the Uncanny
Drive to Comfort
Ethics of keeping difference open
Relationality through Separation (Coming together through Spacing)
Radical de-realization
Singular and Individual